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TWISTED CURRENTS: NAVIGATING THROUGH CORPORATE 
VENUE IN MISSOURI AND THE QUEST TO SIMPLIFY ITS 
CONSTRUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
“I am convinced that there is nothing radically wrong with [Missouri] 
venue statutes if they are properly construed.”1  For nearly fifty years, though, 
Missouri courts have consistently failed to properly construe the state’s venue 
statutes with respect to corporate residence for venue purposes.  The case of 
State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown2 in 1951 presented the Supreme Court of 
Missouri with its first opportunity to decide the novel question as to whether 
the court should adhere to prior statutory interpretation regarding corporate 
venue, or instead venture forth with a new statutory construction.  The court 
chose to take the latter course of action in O’Keefe, setting forth a new 
statutory construction and thus effectively changing the construction of 
corporate residence for venue purposes. 
Since then, Missouri courts have continued to wander down the road paved 
by the O’Keefe court.  The journey down this road, however, has been fraught 
with unnecessary complexity and confusion.  Judge Wolff made reference to 
this complexity when he noted in his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Smith 
v. Gray3 that “[n]early all Missouri venue statutes can be readily understood by 
reading the language of the statutes themselves.  By contrast, [however], venue 
provisions relating to corporations require an understanding of the statutory 
language, the Missouri business corporations statute, and decisions of [the 
Supreme Court of Missouri].”4  In addition to the unnecessary complexity and 
confusion that has been perpetuated by the court’s improper construction, 
occasionally there have been illogical results in corporate venue oriented 
cases.5  Hence, it is time for the complexity, confusion and illogical results that 
have plagued Missouri courts since O’Keefe to be lessened by invoking a new 
 
 1. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 355 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (Storckman, 
J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 2. 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
 3. 979 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (Wolff, J. concurring). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 304; State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 
1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); State ex 
rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
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form of statutory interpretation.  The current construction of corporate 
residence for venue purposes should be replaced with a simplified and more 
logical formula; one which would lessen the need for procedural posturing by 
plaintiffs by establishing a corporation’s residence for venue purposes as either 
the location of its office or agent for the conduct of its usual and customary 
business or the location of its agent for the service of process. 
Part I of this Comment presents a hypothetical that reveals how the current 
statutory construction regarding corporate residence for venue purposes can 
lead to illogical results.  This section also surveys some aspects of procedural 
posturing that have now become commonplace as a result of the court’s current 
corporate venue law interpretation.  Parts II and III briefly canvass the history 
of venue in Missouri and analyze the development of Missouri venue statutes 
concerning corporate residence, respectively.  Part IV discusses the 
development of law regarding corporate residence and examines recent cases 
that perpetuate prior law.  These cases contain certain dissents and 
concurrences that allude to the need for the simplification of corporate venue 
law interpretation.  Part V examines why the present approach fails to 
adequately resolve the problem outlined in Part I and proposes that the 
Supreme Court of Missouri undertake a new interpretive stance when deciding 
corporate venue issues.  In conclusion, Part VI establishes that the residence of 
a corporation for venue purposes should be either the location of its office or 
agent for the conduct of its usual and customary business or the location of its 
registered agent for the service of process. 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
A. Suit is Brought Against a Corporation as the Sole Defendant 
Assume that A is an individual plaintiff who wishes to bring suit against Z 
for a cause of action that accrued in Pope County.6  A is a resident of Ralls 
County.  Z is a Missouri corporation that maintains an office for the transaction 
of its business in the City of St. Louis7 and has its registered agent located in 
St. Louis County.  A wants to bring suit against the corporation in the City of 
St. Louis due to the preconceived notion that a City of St. Louis jury will be 
 
 6. All counties used in this hypothetical problem are in Missouri. 
 7. According to the Missouri Constitution, the City of St. Louis is recognized as both a city 
and as a separate and independent county apart from St. Louis County.  MO. CONST. art. VI, § 31.  
For an in-depth discussion on the separation of the City of St. Louis from St. Louis County, see 
JAMES NEAL PRIMM, LION OF THE VALLEY: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI FROM 1764 TO 1980 (3d ed. 
1998). 
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more sympathetic to A.8  The issue that presents itself is whether the City of St. 
Louis is the appropriate venue for a suit against corporation Z. 
If plaintiff A brings suit solely against the corporation, section 508.040 of 
the Missouri Revised Statutes becomes the applicable venue statute because 
“[w]here all of the defendants are corporations, . . .  the corporate venue statute 
applies.”9  Section 508.040 provides in relevant part: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the 
cause of action accrued, . . . or in any county where such corporations shall 
have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and 
customary business.10 
Thus, A has a choice of venue in this particular instance.  A can bring suit 
against corporation Z in Pope County where the cause of action accrued, or in 
the City of St. Louis since that is where Z maintains an office for the 
transaction of its business.11  Because “[t]he primary purpose of Missouri’s 
venue statutes is to provide a convenient, logical and orderly forum for the 
resolution of disputes,”12 it seems only logical that one may bring suit against a 
corporation in any county where that corporation has an office for the 
transaction of its business. 
One point of relevance should be mentioned to provide clarification.  Just 
because a corporation conducts business in a particular county does not mean 
that venue is proper in that county.13  The Missouri Court of Appeals held in 
Wadlow v. Donald Lindner Homes, Inc.14 that “[t]he venue statute . . . does not 
 
 8. Judge Robertson observed that there have been an “unending series of [cases] in which 
civil tort plaintiffs and defendants enter protracted procedural plotting to embrace or avoid the 
generous juries of the City of St. Louis.”  State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 821.  
See also http://www.verdictreporter.com.  Discrepancies between counties in regard to jury 
verdict amounts is not a “problem” confined solely to the state of Missouri.  “[T]here are certain 
counties in Texas that routinely render verdicts out of proportion with those rendered in similar 
cases in other counties in this state, and, presumably, far in excess of the value of the cases tried.”  
Gregory B. Westfall, The Nature of This Debate: A Look at the Texas Foreign Corporation 
Venue Rule and a Method For Analyzing the Premises and Promises of Tort Reform, 26 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 903, 906 (1995). 
 9. State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. 1984) (en 
banc). 
 10. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. 
 12. State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 13. See Craig A. Adoor & Joseph J. Simeone, The Law of Venue in Missouri, 32 ST. LOUIS. 
U. L.J. 639, 655 (1988). 
 14. 654 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).  In Wadlow, the plaintiff brought suit against a 
corporate defendant in St. Charles County based on the fact that: (1) twenty percent of the 
corporation’s work was done in St. Charles County; (2) the president of the corporation was a 
resident of St. Charles County; (3) a few of the corporate defendant’s business cards listed a St. 
Charles County address; (4) some of the corporate defendant’s mail was received in St. Charles 
County; and (5) some company records were stored in St. Charles County.  The court determined 
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consider the amount of business transacted by a domestic corporation in a 
specific county.  It focuses, instead, on the office of the agent for the 
transaction of business.”15 
B. Suit is Brought Against a Corporation and an Individual 
Thus far, it is clear that a corporation’s residence for venue purposes when 
the corporation is the sole defendant in a suit is in any county where that 
particular corporation maintains an office or agent for the transaction of its 
usual and customary business.  To complicate matters, though, assume further 
that plaintiff A wanted to bring suit against both corporation Z and an 
additional defendant, B, who is an individual and a resident of St. Louis 
County.  When an individual is joined with a corporation, “the general venue 
statute, rather than [section] 508.040, which deals with suits against 
corporations, has been held to be the applicable statute . . . .”16  The general 
venue statute, codified at section 508.010, provides in relevant part: 
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be 
brought: 
(1) When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county within 
which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff 
resides, and the defendant may be found; 
(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, 
the suit may be brought in any such county; 
(3) When there are several defendants, some residents and others 
nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state 
in which any defendant resides; 
(4) When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought 
in any county in this state; . . . .17 
In this situation, because there are two defendants and neither of them are 
nonresidents of the state, section 508.010(2) applies.  Hence, the suit may be 
brought in any county where any one of the defendants resides.  The crucial 
question becomes in which county is the corporation’s residence located.  One 
might assume that a corporation’s residence for venue purposes would be any 
county where it maintains an office or agent for the transaction of its business 
pursuant to section 508.040.  This assumption would allow A to bring suit 
 
that there did not exist an agent or office for the transaction of the corporate defendant’s business 
in St. Charles County.  Id. at 647. 
 15. Wadlow, 654 S.W.2d at 647.  See also Judy v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 892 
S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 16. State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). 
 17. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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against both the individual and the corporation in the City of St. Louis.  
Section 508.040 dictates the locale of corporate residence when the corporation 
is the sole defendant, so surely there would not be a different result merely 
because an individual was joined with the corporation.  According to O’Keefe, 
however, the residence of corporation Z for venue purposes is no longer where 
it maintains an office for the transaction of its business, but rather it is the 
location of its registered agent.18 
It should be noted that “the agent for purposes of corporate venue is not the 
same as the corporation’s registered agent for purposes of service of 
process.”19  The Missouri Court of Appeals held in State ex rel. Pagliara v. 
Stussie20 that agent, “as used in [section] 508.040 need not be defined in the 
same [narrow] way as it has been defined in service of process cases.”21  In 
State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr,22 the Supreme Court of Missouri advanced the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency definition of agent to more fully develop the 
definition that was set forth in Pagliara.23  The court held that the requisite 
elements of an agency relationship are: 
(1) that an agent holds a power to alter legal relations between the principal 
and a third party; (2) that an agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within 
the scope of the agency; [and] (3) that a principal has the right to control the 
conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to the agent.24 
Furthermore, in a case subsequent to Elson, entitled State ex rel. Bunting v. 
Koehr,25 the court made perfectly clear that all three of the requisite agency 
elements must be established for there to exist an agency relationship sufficient 
to support corporate venue.26 
The rules governing registered agents, on the other hand, do not succumb 
to the necessity that certain requirements derived from case law be fulfilled, as 
is the case with mere agency relationships.  Rather, registered agents for the 
service of process are provided for in Missouri statutory law.27  As a result, all 
corporations in Missouri are required by statute to maintain a registered agent 
 
 18. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
 19. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 654. 
 20. 549 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
 21. Id. at 903. 
 22. 856 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 23. James A. Endicott, Finding Corporate Venue in Unlikely Places, 55 J. MO. B. 343, 344 
(1999). 
 24. Elson, 856 S.W.2d at 60 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 12, 13 and 14 
(1959)). 
 25. 865 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 26. See Endicott, supra note 23, at 353. 
 27. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.370-.380 (1998) (regarding domestic corporations); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 351.588 (1998) (regarding foreign corporations).  Insurance corporations, however, 
are not required by statute to have a registered agent for the service of process. 
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for the service of process in the state.  The registered agent can be either an 
individual or a corporate entity, but primarily the basic duty of the registered 
agent is to handle the legal affairs of the corporation.28  It is often the case that 
a corporation will designate as its registered agent another corporation skilled 
in the handling of such legal affairs.29  With an understanding of the difference 
between agent and registered agent for the service of process now achieved, let 
us delve back into the analysis of our problem. 
C. Rationale for the Corporate Residence Discrepancy 
The above-mentioned example wherein an individual and a corporation are 
sued as defendants is actually analogous to a line of cases that have come 
before the Missouri courts.30  The Supreme Court of Missouri has determined 
that when an individual is joined with a corporation, the corporation’s 
residence for venue purposes pursuant to section 508.010 is the location of its 
registered agent.  The court has based this determination on their interpretation 
of section 351.375, which provides in relevant part: 
The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes 
to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.31 
It is the court’s interpretation of section 351.375 that is really at the center 
of the dispute over corporate venue.32  The court’s current interpretation of 
section 351.375 fixes the residence of a corporation at the location of its 
registered agent pursuant to the applicability of section 508.010.  Although this 
interpretation does not necessarily defeat a plaintiff’s chances that it might still 
bring suit in a county where the corporate defendant maintains an office for the 
transaction of its business, it does make it much more difficult.  Hence, in our 
problem if A wants to bring suit against Z and B in the City of St. Louis, A will 
be required to find a way around having the court place reliance on section 
351.375.  To keep the court from looking to section 351.375,  A must render 
section 508.010 inapplicable. 
 
 28. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 351.370 (1998). 
 29. The Company Corporation is one such corporation that provides registered agent 
services to corporations around the country.  See The Company Corporation, at 
http://www.corporate.com/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). 
 30. See State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1951) (en banc); State ex rel. 
Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 
S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 
273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc); State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); State 
ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 31. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 32. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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D. Procedural Posturing 
In State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert,33 that is exactly what 
the plaintiff attempted to do.  The plaintiff brought suit against an individual 
and two corporations for a cause of action that accrued in St. Louis County.  
The individual defendant was a resident of St. Louis County, and the two 
corporate defendants were deemed to be residents of St. Louis County pursuant 
to the court’s reliance on section 351.375 as the means of determining 
corporate residence under section 508.010.34  The suit was filed in the City of 
St. Louis, but one of the corporate defendants filed a motion to dismiss for 
improper venue.  Prior to the judge’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, the 
plaintiff dismissed the individual defendant without prejudice.  The plaintiff 
then asserted that venue was proper in the City of St. Louis pursuant to section 
508.040 since the sole defendants were both corporations and one of the 
corporations maintained an office for the transaction of its business in the City 
of St. Louis.  The court held, however, that “venue is determined as the case 
stands when brought,35 not when a motion challenging venue is decided.”36  
Hence, proper venue was found to still lie in St. Louis County. 
The issue that was raised in DePaul Health Center regarding when venue 
is to be determined has recently been at the center of a profusion of cases in 
Missouri.37  Although the plaintiff did not succeed in its attempt to locate 
venue in the county in which he wanted, the plaintiff did open the door to a 
variety of other means of circumventing the one-two-punch combination of 
sections 351.375 and 508.010 (designating the residence of a corporate 
defendant at the location of the corporation’s registered agent when that 
corporate defendant is joined with an individual).  Hence, the decision 
rendered in DePaul Health Center has resulted in a variety of ingenious (albeit 
controversial) procedural posturing techniques. 
The DePaul Health Center decision leaves the impression that A cannot do 
anything subsequent to the filing of the suit to destroy venue.  Thus, A cannot 
 
 33. 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 34. See id. at 821. 
 35. To more fully understand what the court meant by “when brought,” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY defines “bring suit” as: 
To ‘bring’ an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to the 
initiation of legal proceedings in a suit.  A suit is ‘brought’ at the time it is 
commenced . . . .  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and also most state courts, 
filing a complaint with the court commences a civil action. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
 36. State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) 
(emphasis added). 
 37. See, e.g., State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Sweeney, 920 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); 
State ex rel. Bunker Res., Recycling and Reclamation, Inc. v. Dierker, 955 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. 
1997) (en banc). 
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dismiss the suit against B for the purpose of shifting the applicable venue 
statute from section 508.010 to section 508.040 once A has already brought 
suit against Z and B.  Yet, as the case of State ex rel. Breckenridge v. 
Sweeney38 illustrates, A may have another avenue to pursue in an attempt to 
maintain the corporate defendant’s residence in the City of St. Louis for venue 
purposes. 
In Breckenridge, the procedural posturing concept at issue centered on 
“pretensive joinder.”  In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs 
joined the individual defendant solely as a means of obtaining venue in the 
county where one of the corporate defendants’ registered agent was located.  
The court in Breckenridge noted that “[v]enue is pretensive if (1) the petition 
on its face fails to state a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) 
the petition does state a cause of action against the resident defendant, but . . . 
there is, in fact, no cause of action against the resident defendant . . . .”39  Yet, 
it is the party asserting pretensive joinder that bears the burden of proof and the 
burden of persuasion.40  This is because the court presumes that any allegations 
made by the plaintiff against a defendant are based on an honest belief held by 
the plaintiff that a valid cause of action exists against the defendant.41  The 
case of Breckenridge does not really apply to our problem, because A does not 
want to join an individual to get venue placed in the county of the 
corporation’s registered agent.  If the tables were reversed, however, and the 
registered agent of corporation Z was located in the City of St. Louis while its 
business office was located in St. Louis County, A might indeed want to join B 
as an additional defendant.  And it could do so as long as A showed the joinder 
was not pretensive.  In our problem, however, A wants venue placed in the 
county of the corporation’s business office while still bringing suit against 
individual B. 
If a plaintiff has chosen to join an individual to achieve venue in a county 
where a corporation’s registered agent is located, it seems only natural that a 
plaintiff might choose not to join an individual so as to achieve venue in a 
county where a corporation’s office for the transaction of its business is 
located.  An example of this type of procedural posturing can be found in the 
case of State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason.42  This method of procedural 
posturing is one that A could potentially employ as a means of attaining City of 
St. Louis venue.  In Armstrong, the plaintiff brought suit solely against the 
corporate defendant as a means of achieving venue in the City of St. Louis 
pursuant to section 508.040.  The plaintiff relied on the language in DePaul 
 
 38. 920 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 39. Breckenridge, 920 S.W.2d at 902. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 648. 
 42. State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000) (en banc). 
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Health Center that venue is determined “as the case stands when brought.”43  
The plaintiff subsequently amended its petition the next day to include an 
additional individual defendant.  The defendant corporation alleged that 
plaintiff engaged in a venue maneuvering practice akin to “pretensive 
nonjoinder,” whereby the plaintiff did not join the individual defendant so as to 
avoid destroying City of St. Louis venue.44  The plaintiff, however, in its brief 
to the Supreme Court of Missouri advanced the argument that Missouri law 
grants plaintiffs—not defendants—the right to choose venue from a number of 
permissible choices specified in the venue statutes. 
Theoretically, A could do the same thing by filing suit solely against the 
corporation Z, rather than against Z and the individual B concurrently.  A 
would then later add B as an additional defendant once venue had already been 
determined to lie in the City of St. Louis pursuant to section 508.040.  The 
addition of B as an individual defendant in the suit would theoretically not 
destroy section 508.040 venue in the City of St. Louis because, according to 
DePaul Health Center, venue was proper in the City of St. Louis at the time 
the suit was brought against the sole corporate defendant.  The plaintiff in 
Armstrong relied heavily on this proposition and also on the dissent issued by 
Judge White in State ex rel. Bunker Resource, Recycling & Reclamation, Inc. 
v. Dierker,45 where he succinctly restated the law outlined in DePaul Health 
Center that “if venue properly lies when suit is filed, subsequent events do not 
make venue improper.”46 
This method of procedural posturing, however, has its critics.47  Yet, it is 
evident that with a proper construction of Missouri venue laws, the need for 
such procedural posturing in cases in which an individual is joined with a 
corporation would no longer be necessary.  The problem set forth in the above-
mentioned example is clear—due to prior court interpretations of corporate 
residence in regard to venue, the application of one venue statute instead of the 
other changes a corporation’s residence and is thus overly complex and 
illogical.  The decision rendered in O’Keefe, and in subsequent cases dealing 
with the issue of corporate residence when a corporation is joined with an 
individual, seems contrary to the primary purpose of the venue statutes—to 
provide a “logical . . . forum for the resolution of disputes.”48 
 
 43. State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (en 
banc). 
 44. See Relator’s Brief at 5-6, State ex rel Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed 
Nov. 14, 2000). 
 45. 955 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 46. Id. at 934 (White, J., dissenting). 
 47. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers, State ex rel. 
Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000). 
 48. DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 822 (quoting State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 
S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)). 
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In order to garner a more complete understanding of the primary purpose 
of the venue statutes, it is necessary to delve into a history of venue in 
Missouri.  Once the history of venue in Missouri is understood, only then can 
one grasp how the statutory language has come to be interpreted in such a 
complex and illogical manner, and ultimately how the statutory interpretation 
needs to be changed. 
II.  HISTORY OF VENUE 
Venue is a concept whose origin dates to the foundation of the English 
judicial system.49 Venue originally referred to the locality from which jurors 
were selected.50  Jurors once played an integral role in the questioning of 
witnesses.51  The exercise of this function was found to be most effective if the 
jurors were drawn from the area where the dispute arose or where the land was 
located.52  As the English judicial system began to develop, the active 
participatory role that jurors once played lessened and greater focus was placed 
on the distinction between transitory and local actions.53 
Today, “[t]he typical state statute distinguishes, expressly or effectively, 
between ‘transitory’ actions . . . [and] ‘local’ actions . . . .”54  A transitory 
action is often associated with personal injury claims because venue can follow 
the parties, while a local action involves disputes over fixed subjects, such as 
real property.55  As greater focus was placed on the distinction between local 
versus transitory actions, the venue practice in England changed.  Venue came 
to be “a designation of the location or geographical situs where the court has 
jurisdiction to act in a particular lawsuit.”56 
It is important to note that venue should be distinguished from jurisdiction, 
which stands for the power of the court to decide the case.  According to 
Richardson v. Richardson,57 however, “[t]here is no longer any requirement 
that the suit be filed in a ‘proper’ court and filing in a court of improper venue 
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the defendant.”58  If the court 
 
 49. See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 641. 
 50. See id.; see also William Wirt Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
35-39 (1949). 
 51. See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 641. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Alan J. Lazarus, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service of Process Issues in Litigation 
Involving a Foreign Party, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 29, 67 (1995); see also Adoor & Simeone, supra 
note 13, at 641. 
 55. Lazarus, supra note 54, at 67.  For a more in-depth discussion on the distinction between 
transitory and local actions, see Blume, supra note 50, at 36-9. 
 56. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 57. 892 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) 
 58. Richardson, 892 S.W.2d at 755-56 (citing State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 
870 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)). 
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has jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property, but venue is improper, 
“it inures to the benefit of the parties and the judicial system, for the purpose of 
efficient administration of justice, to bring the issue to the trial court’s attention 
at the earliest possible time.”59  If the trial court determines that venue is 
improper, it must transfer the case to a court where venue is proper.60  Yet, if a 
court lacks jurisdiction over an action and improper venue exists, the court is 
deemed to be powerless to transfer the case.61  “Instead, the court must dismiss 
the case without prejudice, allowing plaintiff the opportunity to file the action 
in the appropriate court.”62  Thus, jurisdiction and venue can be distinguished 
by the fact that jurisdiction relates to the court’s power to hear and determine a 
case, while venue is the place where a case is to be tried.63 
Venue statutes are designed to “protect defendants from being haled into 
distant courts . . . [and] discourage plaintiffs from shopping for the most 
generous jury pool . . . .”64  The place where a case is to be tried, however, has 
proven to be a catalyst for litigation in Missouri for as long as Missouri has 
recognized the concept of venue.  The reason for this litigation is that locating 
the site of a cause of action in the most hospitable forum is important to both 
plaintiffs and defendants.  The importance of finding an advantageous forum 
causes plaintiffs (and to a lesser extent defendants) to enter into protracted 
procedural posturing.  Yet, regardless of all the creative arguments and 
procedural techniques utilized by the parties to a lawsuit, both parties are still 
ultimately constrained by the language of the Missouri venue statutes and the 
court’s interpretation of those statutes.  To understand how the Supreme Court 
of Missouri has arrived at its current interpretation of corporate venue, it is 
necessary to further expound upon the development of the corporate venue 
statute in Missouri. 
III.  STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF VENUE IN MISSOURI 
“Venue in Missouri is determined solely by statute.”65  Missouri venue 
statutes can be traced back to a period when Missouri had not yet even 
achieved statehood.66  Yet, even today Missouri venue statutes still manage to 
adhere to the local versus transitory distinction, which was established and 
relied upon centuries ago in England.67  Suits brought against individuals or 
corporations are today considered to be transitory in nature and may be filed in 
 
 59. State ex rel. Johnson v. Griffin, 945 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 60. Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197. 
 61. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 643. 
 62. Id. at 643-44. 
 63. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197. 
 64. Lazarus, supra note 54, at 67. 
 65. Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 196. 
 66. See, e.g., LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, Ch. 38 (1807). 
 67. See Blume, supra note 51. 
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the county of the defendant’s residence or in the county where the defendant 
may be found.68 
There are eight general venue provisions found in Chapter 508 of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes.69  “The applicability of these provisions depends 
primarily on the type of defendant being sued, and . . . on the types of entities 
that are sued.”70  It should be noted, however, that there are also a wide variety 
of special venue provisions that are relevant to specific acts.71  For our 
purposes, only sections 508.010 and 508.040 will be discussed.  In addition to 
these sections, section 351.375 also requires analysis because the court has 
relied upon it to place corporate residence at the location of the corporation’s 
registered agent when section 508.010 is the applicable venue statute.  Before 
delving into a historical analysis of section 508.040, though, it is necessary to 
mention a few words regarding section 508.010. 
A. The General Venue Statute 
Dating back to 1825,72 the Missouri code specified that venue was proper 
in any county in which any individual defendant resided or in the county where 
the plaintiff resided at the time of service if defendant could be found in that 
county.73  The language of section 508.010(2) has remained relatively 
unchanged since its inception.  In fact, “[t]here has been relatively little 
litigation over the literal interpretation of the various provisions of section 
508.010.”74  The same cannot be said, however, for section 508.040.  And 
while “[t]he development of the statute over the years does not throw much 
light on the situation, other than to display a consistent pattern of broadly 
subjecting corporations to suit,”75 it is nevertheless important to see how in fact 
the corporate venue statute developed. 
 
 68. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197. 
 69. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 508.010-.072 (1994). 
 70. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 639. 
 71. There are numerous special venue provisions that indicate where a suit may be brought 
upon a cause of action filed pursuant to a particular law.  For example, section 210.829.4 of the 
Uniform Parentage Act, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817-.852 (West 1996), is a special venue statute 
which provides that a paternity action (or any other action brought under the Act) “may be 
brought in the county in which the child resides, the mother resides, or the alleged father 
resides. . . .”  MO. REV. STAT. § 210.829.4 (1994).  This Comment will only focus on those venue 
statutes relating to corporate residence.  Hence, it is necessary that “attorneys filing suit in 
Missouri pursuant to a particular act should look to the venue provisions of that act, rather than to 
the general venue provisions of chapter 508.”  Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 639 n.4. 
 72. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 2, § 3 (1825). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 652. 
 75. State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).  The Webb case 
provides an abbreviated, yet informative, discussion on the development of section 508.040.  See 
id. at 114-15. 
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B. The Corporate Venue Statute 
The first corporate venue statute in Missouri can be traced back to the 
Revised Statutes of 1845.76  Chapter 34 of that statute was divided into two 
articles.  Article I concerned a corporation’s general powers, while Article II 
spoke to corporate venue.77  Article II, section 4 provided: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced in the proper court of the 
county wherein the general meetings of the members, or the officers of such 
corporation, have usually been holden, or by law, ought to have been holden.78 
A revision of Article II, section 4 occurred in 1855 and drastically changed 
the language of the corporate venue statute.  The revised Article II, section 4 
read as follows: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced, either in the county where the 
cause of action accrued, or in any county where such corporation shall have, or 
usually keep, an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary 
business.79 
The change represented by the 1855 revision is very similar to the current 
corporate venue statute codified at section 508.040.  In fact, since 1855 only 
two changes have occurred to the actual statutory language.  The first of these 
changes occurred in 1866, when the Missouri legislature decided to delete the 
comma following the word “commenced” and to change the final clause’s 
mentioning of the word “corporation” to the plural “corporations.”80  Thus, the 
1866 revision provided: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the 
cause of action accrued, or in any county where such corporations shall have or 
usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary 
business.81 
While the change to the plural form “corporations” may be thought of as 
relatively minor at face value, it was actually a very significant change because 
it instigated litigation, albeit more than a century later, that forced the Supreme 
Court of Missouri to confront the issue of whether section 508.040 applied 
when each of the several defendants were corporations.  In State ex rel. Webb 
v. Satz,82 the court held that “[t]he statute applies . . . when the only defendant 
 
 76. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34 (1845) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998)). 
 77. State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). 
 78. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34, art. II., §4 (1845) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 
(1998)). 
 79. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34, art. II., §4 (1855) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 
(1998)). 
 80. Webb, 561 S.W.2d at 114. 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. tit. XXIV, ch. 62, §26 (1866) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 
508.040 (1998)). 
 82. Webb, 561 S.W.2d 113. 
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is a single corporation, but to declare that it has no application when there are 
plural defendants, all corporations, is to ignore the broad language with which 
the statute begins.”83  Thus, a suit filed against one or more corporate 
defendants may be brought in any county where at least one of the corporate 
defendants maintains an office or agent for the transaction of business.84  The 
court’s reliance in Webb on the statutory history of section 508.040 evidences 
why it is an important aspect of our discussion.  Without a firm understanding 
as to how the statutory language has evolved since its inception, one cannot 
begin to understand how and why the court has arrived at their current 
statutory interpretation. 
The second change to the 1855 version occurred in 1903 when provisions 
were added pertaining to suits against railroad companies.  The addition of this 
language, though, did not affect the prior corporate venue provisions.  And 
since 1903, the corporate venue statute has remained unchanged and currently 
reads in full as follows: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the 
cause of action accrued, or in case the corporation defendant is a railroad 
company owning, controlling or operating a railroad running into or through 
two or more counties in this state, then in either of such counties or in any 
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent 
for the transaction of their usual and customary business.85 
Now that it has been shown how the corporate venue statute has developed 
in Missouri, let our focus of attention turn to the development of section 
351.375.  It is this section that has come to be interpreted as the designator of 
corporate residence when section 508.010 is deemed to be the applicable venue 
statute. 
C. The Registered Agent Concept 
The concept of a registered agent for the service of process was not 
introduced to Missouri law until 1943.  The General Assembly adopted The 
General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri in 1943.86  Complexity 
concerning the issue of corporate residence began to spread upon the 
introduction of this concept; it did not stem from the venue statutes themselves, 
as they in all actuality are relatively clear.  Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the 1943 
Act related to the registered agent for service of process and were entitled as 
follows: 
 
 83. Id. at 115. 
 84. Id. 
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998). 
 86. The General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri, 1943 Mo. Laws 410, 414 
(current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 351.010 (1998)). 
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Section 9. Each corporation shall continuously maintain a registered office 
and a registered agent—address shall be stated in articles of 
incorporation. 
Section 10. A corporation may change address of its registered office, how. 
Section 11. Capacity of registered agent of corporation.87 
Section 10, which is now codified under section 351.375, contains the alleged 
venue culprit provision: 
The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes 
to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.88 
Section 351.375 was actually derived from section 12 of the 1933 Illinois 
Business Corporation Act.89  The alleged venue culprit sentence, however, was 
not found in the Illinois statute.  Instead, it was introduced in section 10 of 
House Bill 64 and remained unchanged until the law was passed in 1943.90 
It is important to note that the term “corporation” as used today in Chapter 
351 does not apply to foreign corporations pursuant to 351.015(6).91  A foreign 
corporation is defined under section 351.015(7) as “a corporation for profit 
organized under laws other than the laws of this state . . . .”92  Hence, section 
351.375 only applies to domestic corporations.93  Although section 351.375 
states that “the location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all 
purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained,” the 
equivalent provision applicable to foreign corporations, section 351.588,94 
contains no such language concerning the residence of foreign corporations.  
Prior to the enactment of section 351.588, section 351.62595 was the applicable 
statute, and it actually referenced section 351.375.  When the General 
Assembly enacted section 351.588 in 1990, the legislature not only repealed 
section 351.625 and its reference to section 351.375, but it enacted the 
provision without language establishing the residence of a foreign corporation 
to be “for all purposes” the county in which it maintained its registered 
office.96  Therefore, one should remember that prior to 1990, sections 351.375 
 
 87. Id. at 419-20. 
 88. Id. at 420.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375(2) (emphasis added). 
 89. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); see also 
Business Corporation Act, 1933 Ill. Laws 316. 
 90. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 634. 
 91. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(6) (1998). 
 92. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(7) (1998). 
 93. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 (1998) (statutes apply to foreign 
corporations). 
 94. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.588 (1998). 
 95. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.625 (repealed 1990). 
 96. See H.R. 1432, 85th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1990). 
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and 351.625 were ensconced together in the amalgam of statutory 
interpretation. 
Since O’Keefe97 in 1951, the court has held that section 351.375 dictates 
where a corporation’s residence is to be located when that corporation is 
brought into a suit pursuant to section 508.010.  Yet, the court’s construction 
of corporate residence has not always been this way.  Prior to the introduction 
of the registered agent concept in 1943, the case of State ex rel. Henning v. 
Williams98 firmly settled all questions of corporate residence for venue 
purposes.  Thus, it is now time to revisit the period prior to 1943 in which no 
predecessor statutes spoke of a registered agent.  From there, it will become 
apparent exactly when the Supreme Court of Missouri lapsed into the quagmire 
of confused statutory construction regarding corporate residence.  Once one 
understands how and why the court has continued to perpetuate such an 
illogical construction, one can then understand why the need for change 
beckons so loudly today. 
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW REGARDING CORPORATE RESIDENCE 
A. Application of the General Venue Statute 
The 1926 case of State ex rel. Columbia National Bank of Kansas City v. 
Davis99 was a landmark case that squarely presented the Supreme Court of 
Missouri with the opportunity to decide whether the general venue statute 
(section 508.010) or the corporate venue statute (section 508.040) fixed venue 
of civil actions against corporations when they are joined with individual 
defendants.  The case of Columbia National Bank centered on a plaintiff who 
attempted to bring suit against both a corporation and individual defendants in 
a county where one of the individual defendants resided, notwithstanding the 
fact that the corporate defendant did not maintain an office or agent for the 
transaction of its business in that county.100 
The defendant in Columbia National Bank advanced the argument that 
when a corporation is a defendant, section 508.040 is the applicable venue 
statute regardless of whether the corporation is joined as a defendant with one 
or more individual defendants.  The plaintiff conceded, and the court 
acknowledged, that had the plaintiff brought suit solely against the corporation, 
section 508.040 would have applied and suit could not have been brought in 
the same county since the corporation did not maintain an office or agent in 
that county.101  Yet, the plaintiff argued that when both a corporation and 
 
 97. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
 98. 131 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1939) (en banc). 
 99. 284 S.W. 464 (Mo. 1926) (en banc). 
 100. Id. at 465-66. 
 101. Id. at 466. 
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individuals are defendants to a suit, section 508.010 should be the applicable 
venue statute.  And in fact, that is exactly what the court held—“section 
[508.010] fixes the venue of civil actions against corporations where they are 
joined as defendants with one or more other defendants, and . . . section 
[508.040] fixes such venue only in actions where the corporation defendant is 
the sole defendant.”102  The court also stated that “[sections 508.010] and 
[508.040] should be construed together and a meaning given to each which 
will not destroy the other . . . .”103 
B. The General Venue Statute and Corporate Residence 
In 1939, Henning further expounded on the decision rendered in Columbia 
National Bank.  In Henning, the plaintiff brought suit against an individual 
resident of St. Charles County and a foreign corporation licensed to do 
business in Missouri.104  The corporation had an office for the transaction of its 
business in the City of St. Louis.  Section 508.010 was the applicable venue 
statute in Henning, according to the previous holding in Columbia National 
Bank, since there was a mixture of corporate and individual defendants.  Yet, 
while the issue in Columbia National Bank was which statute applied, the issue 
in Henning was where the corporate defendant’s residence was pursuant to 
section 508.010.105 
Forced to reconcile sections 508.010 and 508.040, the court in Henning 
held that because a corporation’s residence when sued alone was in any county 
where the corporation had an office or agent for the transaction of its business 
under section 508.040, the corporation’s residence should be regarded as 
established in the same way when it is joined as a defendant with another 
under section 508.010.  Referring to the general venue statute, the court stated 
that it could “see no reason why [the corporate defendant’s] residence should 
not be regarded as established in the same way when, perchance, they are 
joined as defendants with another, thereby fixing the venue under [section 
508.040].”106 
Notice that the holding in Henning is in stark contrast to the decision 
rendered in O’Keefe only a few years later.  The rationale given in Henning for 
the court’s reliance on section 508.040 as the means of dictating corporate 
residence pursuant to section 508.010 can actually be traced back to that given 
in Columbia National Bank: “Said sections of the statute should be held in pari 
 
 102. Id. at 470. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 562. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 565. 
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materia.”107  The court in Columbia National Bank endeavored to present the 
following definition regarding pari materia: 
Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or to 
the same class of persons or things.  In the construction of a particular statute, 
or in the interpretation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same 
subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with 
it, as together constituting one law.  The endeavor should be made, by tracing 
the history of legislation on the subject . . . .  So far as reasonably possible the 
statutes, although seemingly in conflict with each other, should be harmonized, 
and force and effect given to each, as it will not be presumed that the 
Legislature, in the enactment of a subsequent statute, intended to repeal an 
earlier one, unless it has done so in express terms; nor will it be presumed that 
the Legislature intended to leave on the statute books two contradictory 
enactments.108 
The decision handed down in Henning was short-lived.  No longer would a 
corporation’s residence for venue purposes when joined with an individual be 
in the county where it maintained an office of the transaction of its business.  
O’Keefe, which came before the court after the registered agent concept had 
been introduced to Missouri law, was the case that effectively changed the 
construction of corporate residence.109  In O’Keefe, suit was brought in Dade 
County against an individual defendant who was a resident of Gentry County 
and a Missouri corporation.110  The corporation was a common carrier and had 
its registered office and registered agent located in Jasper County.111  The 
plaintiff premised venue in Dade County because the corporation operated a 
bus line in Dade County.112  The cause of action, however, actually accrued in 
Vernon County.113  The issue before the court was the same as in Henning: 
What is the residence of a corporation for venue purposes when both a 
corporation and an individual are sued together?  While the issues might have 
been the same, the decisions rendered could not have been more different. 
C. Overturning Henning: A New Statutory Construction 
The court in O’Keefe recognized that the plaintiff was operating under the 
theory that “the residence of a corporation is wherever it operates and has an 
office and agent.”114  The court did not agree with that theory, however.  To 
that effect, the holding in Henning was overruled as the court in O’Keefe held 
 
 107. Columbia National, 284 S.W. at 470. 
 108. Id. at 470. 
 109. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
 110. Id. at 305-06. 
 111. Id. at 306. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 305. 
 114. O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 306. 
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that the legal residence of a corporation is fixed by the location of its registered 
agent when a corporation is sued together with an individual.115  The court 
looked to the registered agent concept as outlined in section 351.375 to provide 
the location of corporate residence under section 508.010.  The court stated 
that section 351.375 “applies with equal force to venue statutes.”116  Thus, 
venue was found to be improper in Dade County. 
Just three years after O’Keefe, State ex rel. Whiteman v. James117 presented 
the court the opportunity to drive home the notion that when section 508.010 is 
the applicable venue statute, a corporation’s residence is located in the county 
of its registered agent for the service of process.  In Whiteman, the cause of 
action accrued in Holt County and plaintiff brought suit in Jackson County 
against an individual defendant who was a resident of Andrew County and a 
foreign corporation.  The foreign corporation maintained an office for the 
transaction of its business in Jackson County and had a registered agent located 
in the City of St. Louis.  The court noted that essentially the only difference 
between O’Keefe and Whiteman was the fact that the corporation in O’Keefe 
was a domestic corporation while the corporation in Whiteman was foreign.118  
The court deemed this distinction insignificant.  Rather, the focus in Whiteman 
was the “for all purposes”119 language contained in section 351.375. 
During the period of time in which Whiteman was considered, section 
351.625 was the applicable statute in regard to foreign corporations.  Since it 
referenced section 351.375, the court was allowed to construe section 351.375 
as dictating corporate residence regardless of whether the corporation was 
domestic or foreign.  As shall soon become apparent, though, sections 351.625 
and 351.375 were found to be replete with wrinkles that allowed for 
applicative maneuverability. 
The issue in Whiteman was practically the same as that presented in 
Henning: “[W]hether a foreign corporation licensed to do business in 
[Missouri] and having an office and place of business in some county is a 
resident of that county” under section 508.010.120  The plaintiff in Whiteman 
relied on the decision rendered in Henning because it answered the issue in the 
affirmative.  The defendant, though, asserted that the holding in Henning was 
prior to when the residence provisions of section 351.375 were enacted.  The 
court held that this issue was properly settled in O’Keefe, whereby it was 
determined that section 351.375 dictates a corporation’s residence at the 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc). 
 118. Id. at 300. 
 119. MO. REV STAT. § 351.375 (1998). 
 120. Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 299 (citing State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 131 S.W.2d 561, 
562 (Mo. 1939) (en banc)). 
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location of its registered agent.121  Basically, while O’Keefe stood for the 
proposition that section 351.375 applied to domestic corporations when section 
508.010 was applicable, Whiteman extended this theory to also apply to 
foreign corporations. 
Yet, it is in Whiteman that one can see the first signs of reproach 
concerning the court’s corporate venue statutory construction.  Judge Hyde, in 
his dissent, noted that “[w]hile [section 351.375] is sufficient to authorize 
service on a corporation at its registered office, it is not a venue statute.”122  
Continuing, Judge Hyde stated: “I do not think this general provision should be 
held to control over the specific provisions of sections 508.010 and 508.040, 
which were intended as venue statutes and which were left unamended.”123  
Furthermore, he explained that  “the most reasonable construction is that 
[section 351.375] only adds another office (the registered office) to those 
where service can be made and venue established.”124  Thus, “while by 
[section 351.375], a corporation may have a residence at its registered office 
for all purposes including venue . . . it may also have other residences created 
by statute for purposes of service and venue.”125 
In fact, even the majority in Whiteman conceded that its statutory 
construction would result in the anomaly of a plaintiff being able to sue a 
corporation alone in one county under section 508.040, but not in that same 
county if the corporation was joined with an individual resident of another 
county.126  The majority questioned the accuracy of its holding.  This 
admonition, as well as Judge Hyde’s dissent, rendered the court’s prior 
statutory construction vulnerable to future criticism.  Before more criticism 
could be engendered, though, the case of State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield127 
occasioned a new wrinkle for corporate venue construction. 
D. The Foreign Corporation Distinction 
In Stamm, the issue presented was whether an action might be maintained 
against a foreign insurance corporation and an individual in the county where 
the corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its business.  The fact 
that the corporation was an insurance company created an opportunity to 
construe corporate venue anew.  The court noted that at the time the case was 
brought, sections 351.370, 351.375 and 351.380 governed domestic 
corporations, while sections 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 applied to foreign 
 
 121. Id. at 300. 
 122. Id. at 301 (Hyde, J. dissenting). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 302 (Hyde, J. dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 300. 
 127. 340 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1960) (en banc). 
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corporations.128  Yet, “insurance companies are not within the purview of these 
statutes because they are among the corporations specifically excepted by [the] 
provisions of [section] 351.690.”129 
The court in Stamm relied on the following provisions of section 351.690, 
which read in relevant part: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to existing corporations 
as follows: 
(1) Those provisions of this law . . . shall be applicable, to the same extent and 
with the same effect, to all existing corporations, domestic and foreign. . . ; 
(2) No provision of this law, other than those mentioned in subdivision (1), 
shall be applicable to banks, trust companies, insurance companies, 
building and loan associations, savings bank and safe deposit companies, 
mortgage loan companies, and nonprofit corporations; . . .130 
Further, section 375.210 required insurance companies to appoint the 
superintendent of insurance as their registered agent for service of process.  
The court held, however, that section 375.210 was a service statute, not a 
venue statute.131  Hence, while venue in a suit against a foreign insurance 
corporation and an individual was indeed governed by section 508.010, the 
residence of the foreign insurance corporation was in the county where it 
maintained an office for the transaction of its business.  In accordance with this 
holding, the court overruled Whiteman to the extent that it held section 351.375 
was applicable to foreign corporations.132  With Whiteman now overruled in 
part by Stamm, State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen133 became a case that once again 
concerned the residence of a foreign corporation for venue purposes when both 
a corporation and an individual are sued together. 
Prior to Bowden, Whiteman dictated that the residence of both domestic 
and foreign corporations under section 508.010 was controlled by section 
351.375.  But with the decision rendered in Stamm, the court in Bowden found 
it necessary to further elaborate on the domestic versus foreign corporation 
distinction.  The plaintiff in Bowden contended that the residence of a foreign 
corporation, when joined with an individual defendant, should be governed by 
section 508.040.134  The court was quick to point out, however, that section 
508.040 only applies when a corporation is the sole defendant.135  Thus, 
 
 128. Id. at 633. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 633 (quoting 1943 Mo. laws 410) (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at 634. 
 132. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 634. 
 133. 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
 134. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 345. 
 135. Id. 
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regardless of whether the corporation is domestic or foreign, section 508.040 
will only apply if that corporation is sued alone. 
The court went on to mention that “[a]s far as domestic corporations 
organized under the general business laws of Missouri are concerned that issue 
is settled by the closing sentence of [section 351.375].”136  Regarding foreign 
corporations, though, sections 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 are the applicable 
statutes.137  The court held that a foreign corporation resides in the county 
where its registered office and registered agent is located under section 
351.620.138  While a different statute was utilized to confer corporate residence 
for a foreign corporation pursuant to section 508.010, the court noted its 
conclusion was supported by Whiteman and that Bowden did not overrule 
Whiteman to any further extent than did Stamm.139 
Judge Storckman, however, did not agree with the majority.  He opined of 
O’Keefe, Whiteman and Bowden that none of them correctly construed section 
351.375.140  He agreed with Judge Hyde’s dissent in Whiteman that section 
351.375 merely adds another potential place in which venue might be 
established.141  “The O’Keefe and Whiteman cases seem to regard the 
provision [section 351.375] as if it reads ‘for all purposes of venue,’ but it does 
not have that effect.  At best, venue is only one of several purposes 
involved.”142  Judge Storckman believed that “the legislative intent was to 
make sure that another place of venue and service was designated or continued 
as it was under the prior law; it was not the legislative intent to destroy the 
effectiveness of [section 508.010(2)] as it had been interpreted and construed 
in the Henning case.”143  Finally, Judge Storckman cautioned that the majority 
opinion could give rise to implicit corporate forum shopping, whereby 
“corporations, by a judicious choice of a registered office, will be given greater 
control over the place where they can be sued with other defendants . . . .”144 
Since Judge Storckman had written the majority opinion in Stamm holding 
that section 375.210 was merely a service statute with respect to insurance 
corporations, he wanted to adopt that rationale to support the conclusion that 
section 351.375 was also a service statute and not a venue statute with respect 
to business corporations.  Yet, while Judge Storckman’s majority opinion in 
 
 136. Id. at 349. 
 137. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.620, 351.625, 351.630 (1998) (pertaining to foreign 
corporations). 
 138. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 351. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 351 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) 
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Stamm had provided that the residence of a foreign insurance company under 
section 508.010(2) was not governed by section 375.210 and therefore not in 
the county of the corporation’s registered agent, he failed to articulate just 
where that insurance corporation’s residence should be. 
E. The Insurance Corporation Distinction 
Consequently, the case of State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher145 
presented the court with the opportunity to decide that very issue.  Rothermich 
was a landmark case because, as the court realized, “Missouri courts have 
heretofore established no definitive definition of residence of foreign insurance 
corporations for purposes of [section] 508.010(2).”146  In Rothermich, the 
cause of action accrued in St. Charles County.147  Suit was brought in the City 
of St. Louis against an individual defendant who resided in St. Louis County 
and a foreign insurance corporation authorized to do business in Missouri.148  
The insurance corporation maintained an office for the transaction of its 
business in the city of St. Louis, and had designated the Director of Insurance 
to receive service of process on the corporation’s behalf.149  Service of process 
on the Director occurred in Cole County.150 
This issue was analogous to that in Stamm: Where to locate the residence 
of a foreign insurance corporation for venue purposes under section 508.010 
when one or more corporations are being sued together with one or more 
individuals?  Before delving into this issue, the court sought to make a few 
points clear: (1) when any corporation is the sole defendant, regardless of 
whether it is foreign or domestic, insurance or business, section 508.040 is the 
applicable venue statute;151 (2) when one or more corporations are sued 
together with one or more individuals, section 508.010 is the applicable venue 
statute;152 and (3) with regard to venue under section 508.010, foreign 
insurance corporations are treated differently than both domestic and foreign 
general business corporations.153 
With these three key points in mind, the court then answered the question 
as to where the foreign insurance corporation’s residence was located under 
section 508.010.  “Since Chapter 351 excludes insurance corporations from 
applicability, the definition of residence for business corporations taken from 
[section 351.375] has been found to be inapplicable to insurance 
 
 145. 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 146. Id. at 197. 
 147. See id. at 196. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 196. 
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corporations.”154  In addition, statutory law does not mandate that insurance 
corporations maintain a registered agent in Missouri.  As mentioned in Stamm, 
“[s]ince foreign insurance corporations are not required to designate a 
registered office and registered agent under the general corporation laws, the 
construction placed upon [section] 351.375 . . . has no application . . . .”155 
“Accordingly, this court holds the language of [section] 508.040 . . . to be 
persuasive in determining the definition of ‘residence’ of a foreign insurance 
corporation, pursuant to [section] 508.010.”156  Therefore, the location of a 
foreign insurance corporation’s residence under section 508.010 is “in any 
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent 
for the transaction of their usual and customary business.”157  The court in 
Rothermich apparently wished to cover all of the bases regarding its new 
interpretative stance on an insurance corporation’s residence.  Consequently, 
the court even advanced a definition of “agent” for venue purposes with 
respect to insurance corporations that was set forth in State ex rel. Cameron 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Reeves.158  The court determined that “‘one who 
is employed under an agreement to accomplish results on behalf of his 
principal whom he represents [is an insurance agent for venue 
purposes]’. . . .”159  Utilizing this rationale, the court found venue to be proper 
in the City of St. Louis because the residence of a foreign insurance 
corporation is in any county where it maintains an office or agent for the 
transaction of its business, that is, the selling of insurance policies.160 
The insurance corporation in Rothermich was a foreign corporation.161  
And that is why the defendant in State ex rel. Smith v. Gray162 argued that the 
Rothermich holding did not control.  In Smith, suit was brought in Jackson 
County against a Missouri insurance corporation, a general business 
corporation, and an individual.163  It was conceded that section 508.010 was 
the applicable venue statute, but at issue was the residence of a domestic 
insurance corporation pursuant to section 508.010.164  The insurance 
corporation had listed in its articles of incorporation that the location of its 
principal office was in Boone County, but it also maintained an office in 
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 155. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Mo. 1960) (en banc). 
 156. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
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 163. See id. at 191. 
 164. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] TWISTED CURRENTS 1079 
Jackson County for the sale of insurance policies.165  The plaintiff brought suit 
in Jackson County because the insurance corporation had an office in that 
county.  The question before the court was whether that county was the proper 
residence for the insurance corporation under section 508.010, or whether 
Boone County was the location of residence for venue purposes. 
In response to this issue, the court stated, “unlike general and business 
corporations, no statute makes [the location of the principal office] the 
residence of an insurance corporation.”166  The court then proceeded to discuss 
how the 1943 law only affected general business corporations.  Following this 
discussion, the court held that  
[b]y changing the law for general and business corporations but not for 
insurance companies, the legislature left intact this Court’s definition of 
‘residence’ for insurance corporations.  Under sections 508.010(2) and 
508.040, foreign and domestic insurance corporations ‘reside’ for venue 
purposes in any county where they have or usually keep an office or agent for 
the transaction of their usual and customary business.167 
F. An Opportunity for Change: An Opportunity Lost 
Since O’Keefe,168 the Supreme Court of Missouri has heard a multitude of 
cases concerning a corporation’s residence for venue purposes.  Many of these 
cases have attempted to change the court’s interpretation of the venue statutes 
by introducing new ripples into the stream of corporate venue.  The court has 
consistently managed to calm these ripples, albeit with the one exception 
regarding insurance corporations.  Yet, just because the stream of corporate 
venue may appear to be smooth on the surface does not mean that twisted 
currents are not lurking beneath.  And that is exactly what the cases of State ex 
rel. Armstrong v. Mason169 and State ex rel. Taylor v. Clark170 sought to 
expose—the twisted currents of an overly complex and illogical interpretation 
underneath the stream of corporate venue decisions. 
In Armstrong, the cause of action accrued in Webster County.171  The 
plaintiff brought suit against an individual and a corporate defendant.  The 
individual defendant was a resident of Greene County, while the corporate 
defendant was a Delaware corporation that maintained its registered office and 
agent for service of process in St. Louis County.172  The corporate defendant, 
 
 165. See id. at 191-92. 
 166. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 167. Id. at 193 (emphasis added). 
 168. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
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2000). 
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however, maintained an office for the transaction of its usual and customary 
business in the City of St. Louis.  Plaintiff initially brought suit solely against 
the corporate defendant in the City of St. Louis, basing venue on the corporate 
venue statute.  The next day, however, the plaintiff filed a First Amended 
Petition whereby the individual defendant was joined.  While Armstrong dealt 
in part with the concept of ‘pretensive nonjoinder’ as discussed above in the 
section on procedural posturing,173 the case really centered on the issue of 
corporate venue. 
The defendants sought to transfer the case from the City of St. Louis based 
upon improper venue.  Judge David C. Mason of the Circuit Court of the City 
of St. Louis, however, denied the motion to transfer.174  So too did the Eastern 
District Court of Appeals, as it denied the defendants’ petition for writ of 
prohibition.175  Hence, the case came before the Supreme Court of Missouri. 
The defendants/relator contended that the respondent judge erred in 
holding that venue was proper in the City of St. Louis.176  They argued using 
the O’Keefe rationale that section 351.375 determines corporate residence 
when section 508.010 has been invoked as the applicable venue statute due to 
there being a mix of corporate and non-corporate defendants.177  The relator 
stated that “[i]t is self-evident that, by enacting two separate statutes, the 
legislature of Missouri intended that a distinction be made between corporate 
defendants and individual defendants when determining proper venue.”178  
Furthermore, the relator stated that “[i]f Missouri’s venue statutes are to be 
changed, the General Assembly is the proper forum for change, not the 
Court.”179 
The respondent, however, maintained that “[c]onstruction of [s]ection 
508.010, [s]ection 508.040 and the business corporation statute in pari materia 
indicate that the ‘all purposes’ language of [s]ection 351.375 merely creates an 
additional venue choice.”180  The respondent sought to have the court 
reconsider its prior holdings in such cases as O’Keefe, Whiteman and Bowden 
and to construe the “for all purposes of venue” provision in section 351.375 to 
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stand not as a preclusionary provision against any other location for the 
purpose of venue, but rather as an inclusionary provision whereby the location 
of the corporation’s registered agent is simply an additional venue choice.181 
In Taylor, which was actually a companion case to Armstrong, corporate 
residence for venue purposes was once again the central issue.  Yet, Judge 
Thomas C. Clark of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri held opposite 
that of Judge Mason in Armstrong.  Thus, two cases with virtually identical 
venue issues were decided differently at the circuit court level.  Hence, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri became the appropriate body to determine the 
outcome and resolve the discrepancy. 
An opportunity was before the court to look upon its prior holdings, to 
notice the unnecessary complexity that has been perpetuated and to set forth a 
new statutory construction.  The court, though, failed to capitalize on this 
opportunity.  In an amazing and unique turn of events, the court ruled in favor 
of the respondent in Armstrong and also in favor of the respondent in Taylor.  
Remember, the respondent judge in Armstrong declined to transfer venue 
whereas the judge in Taylor did transfer venue.  This judicial anomaly resulted 
from the Supreme Court of Missouri rotating the judges after hearing oral 
arguments for each case.  Thus, four justices heard arguments for both cases 
while the other three judges were different for each case.  The lack of 
uniformity on the court resulted in a split decision.  And as a result, an opinion 
was not written and neither case carries any precedential value. 
G. Analysis 
During the course of navigation down the stream of corporate venue, from 
its inception to its current interpretation by the Supreme Court of Missouri, it is 
apparent that somewhere along the stream a divergence occurred.  It was a 
divergence between philosophies, between what the legislature originally 
intended when it enacted the corporate venue statute and what the court now 
perceives to be the correct interpretation of that statute.  Luckily, when this 
divergence occurred can be pinpointed with exactness.  Furthermore, the 
reason for that separation can even be identified; it was the introduction of 
section 351.375 into Missouri law in 1943.  Once section 351.375 came to be 
interpreted by the court as the statute that provides for a corporation’s 
residence in the county where its registered agent is located under section 
508.010, illogical results began to occur. 
For purposes of section 508.010, sections 508.040 and 351.375 are in 
conflict.  Section 508.040 dictates venue when a corporation is the sole 
defendant.  Yet, section 351.375 negates that statute when a corporation is 
joined with an individual defendant.  Hence, “the determination of proper 
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venue for a corporation turns on the essentially inconsequential presence of a 
single unincorporated defendant.”182  This is illogical. 
A plaintiff should be able to bring suit against a corporate defendant in the 
county where the corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its 
business, regardless of whether an individual defendant is joined in the suit.  
The majority’s rationale in Bowden, however, attempts to refute this 
interpretative stance.  But as Judge Storckman expressed in his dissent in 
Bowden, “[s]tatutes should not be construed so as to render another statute 
meaningless unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly expressed . . . .”183  
The current construction of section 351.375 when section 508.010 is the 
applicable venue statute does in fact render another statute (section 508.040) 
meaningless.  Yet, the majority of the court in Bowden found this to be 
acceptable.184 
As support for their holding that section 508.040 should not provide the 
residence of a corporation for venue purposes when section 508.010 is the 
applicable venue statute, the court in Bowden posited the following question, 
which will be applied to the characters in the example from section II: 
[I]f plaintiff ‘A’ brings a suit against corporation ‘Z’ and individual defendant 
‘B’ in the City of St. Louis, how would defendant ‘B’ go about determining 
whether the venue of the suit in the City of St. Louis was or was not proper as 
to him?185 
The court asked this question because it believed that were corporation Z to 
“reside” in any county in the state in which it had an office for the transaction 
of its business, then defendant B would be faced with an uncertain issue of 
fact.  And that issue would be whether Z was doing business as usual and 
customary in that county. 
This rationale, however, is superfluous.  The court’s later decision in Webb 
regarding multiple corporate defendants does a great deal of damage to the 
Bowden court’s reasoning.  When the court in Webb held that section 508.040 
applied to multiple corporate defendants, must not the additional corporate 
defendant pursuant to section 508.040 undergo the same discovery to ascertain 
whether venue is appropriate to it?  Since section 508.040 applies when one 
corporation is the sole defendant and when one or more corporations are the 
sole defendants, an individual defendant under section 508.010 is placed in the 
same shoes as an additional corporate defendant under section 508.040.  It is 
not any more difficult for an individual defendant to determine whether a 
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corporation is doing business as usual and customary in one county than it is 
for another corporation seeking to determine the same thing. 
While Webb may have poked the first hole in the Bowden majority’s 
rationale, the holding in Rothermich dealt it a crushing blow.  In Rothermich, it 
was held that section 508.040 located venue for insurance corporations 
regardless of whether or not an individual was joined.186  Thus, if an individual 
is sued along with an insurance corporation, that individual cannot rely on the 
Bowden rationale that locating venue in the county where the insurance 
corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its usual and customary 
business would burden the individual defendant with an uncertain issue of fact 
as to whether that insurance corporation was doing business as usual and 
customary in that county.  If the Bowden rationale cannot apply when an 
insurance corporation is a party, why should it be allowed to have merit when a 
general business corporation is a defendant?  Is the burden on the individual 
defendant that much greater when a general business corporation is involved 
rather than an insurance corporation?  The answer is clearly no. 
While the decisions in Webb and Rothermich may have swept the Bowden 
majority’s rationale out of the stream of corporate venue, it unfortunately did 
not negate the holding of Bowden.  Something more was needed to overturn 
the precedent established long ago in O’Keefe and perpetuated by its progeny.  
And that something more has finally arrived.  As this Comment has shown, 
there is little if any rationale remaining to support the court’s current 
interpretative stance.  The court’s statutory construction has navigated the 
court down the stream of corporate venue.  The decisions resulting from this 
statutory construction have built a seemingly solid ship for sailing down that 
stream.  The ship’s sails, however, have become flaccid as a result of there no 
longer being the wind of rationale to keep them full.  Rather, the wind of 
change now blows.  And it is a harsh wind.  A wind stirring as a consequence 
of the illogical results promulgated by the court’s current interpretative stance.  
This wind has created ever-heightening waves lunging at the chance to sink 
that ship.  The ship now sits slowly listing.  And it is only when that ship sinks 
that the wind of change will subside and the twisted currents of corporate 
venue will finally be quelled. 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
While illogical results can be found in such cases as O’Keefe, Whiteman, 
Bowden and in the companion cases of Armstrong and Taylor,187 another 
 
 186. See State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
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example whereby the court’s interpretation of corporate venue has an 
anomalous effect can be found in the example outlined in Part I of this 
Comment.  For it is in that example that venue is proper in the City of St. Louis 
if A brings suit solely against the corporation, but venue will be improper in the 
City of St. Louis if A brings suit against both Z and the individual defendant B.  
In all of these cases, venue was found to be improper in the county where the 
corporation had an office for the transaction of its business.  This is an 
anomaly of statutory construction, because had any of the corporations been 
the sole defendant in any of those cases, venue would have been found to be 
proper.  The plaintiff should be able to bring suit against corporation Z in the 
county where Z maintains an office for the transaction of its business, 
regardless of whether or not individual defendant B is joined in the suit. 
Even after the court acknowledged this anomalous result years ago in 
Whiteman, why does the statutory construction allowing for this anomalous 
result persist?  Answering this question becomes even more difficult when one 
considers how the court in Rothermich declared that “it is desirable to arrive at 
a result where venue is applied more uniformly so that a myriad of venue rules 
do not exist contributing to and encouraging litigation relating to venue 
problems.”188  Unfortunately, a myriad of venue rules does exist.  And it is this 
myriad that places an unnecessary burden on the plaintiff to determine which 
venue rules apply. 
If the sole defendant is a corporation, then section 508.040 is the 
applicable venue statute and the corporation’s residence is located in any 
county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its usual and 
customary business.189  Yet, if there is a corporate defendant and an individual 
defendant, then section 508.010 governs.190  When section 508.010 governs, 
the plaintiff must then look to section 351.375.  But if the corporation is an 
insurance corporation, section 351.375 is no longer applicable.191  Rather, it is 
once again section 508.040.  If there should happen to be a mix of general 
business corporations and insurance corporations, in addition to individual 
defendants, then section 508.040 only applies to the insurance corporations 
whereas section 508.010 and section 351.375 determine the residence of the 
general business corporations. 
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Instead of wondering why this illogical statutory construction has been 
allowed to advance throughout the decades, it is more appropriate to delve into 
how that statutory construction can be changed.  A proposed solution, echoed 
by Judges Hyde, Storckman and Wolff, is that sections 508.040 and 351.375 
be interpreted so as to promote harmony among the two.  Rather than having 
section 351.375 negate section 508.040, section 351.375 should be construed 
to provide another place of venue—not the exclusive place of venue under 
section 508.010. 
As Judge Wolff succinctly stated in his concurrence in Smith: 
[T]he most logical way to reconcile the venue statutes and the business 
corporation statute is to hold that a business corporation for venue purposes is 
a resident of a county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its 
usual business (section 508.040) and a resident of a county where it maintains 
its registered office (section 351.375).  To interpret sections 508.040 and 
351.375 as each defining residence for venue purposes not only is logical, but 
eliminates the strategic choice of joining an individual defendant for venue 
purposes where, ordinarily, a plaintiff would not otherwise be inclined to do 
so.192 
It is illogical to hold that a corporation’s residence is in one county when the 
corporation is the sole defendant, but that its residence is in a different county 
when the corporation is joined with an individual.  It is even more illogical 
when one considers that it is often the case that the county where a corporate 
defendant maintains its registered agent possesses no other nexus to the 
underlying claim. 
By eliminating the competition between sections 508.040 and 351.375 
when section 508.010 is the applicable venue statute, controversial procedural 
posturing by plaintiffs would be greatly decreased.  A reduction in the need for 
procedural posturing would result in a reduction in procedural-oriented 
litigation.  If the residence of a corporate defendant under section 508.010 was 
either in the county where the corporation maintained an office for the 
transaction of business or in the county where the corporation’s registered 
agent was located, plaintiffs would not need to add or dismiss defendants 
solely for the purpose of obtaining a hospitable forum, and defendants would 
not need to question every action by the plaintiff. 
This construction would also not harm defendant corporations, as it merely 
combines the two statutorily designated locales where corporations can be 
sued.  It does not inflict upon them a new or altered location of corporate 
residence.  An insurance corporation’s residence pursuant to section 508.010 is 
dictated by section 508.040.  Hence, there is no reason that this concept cannot 
be expanded to cover all corporations under section 508.010.  A corporation’s 
residence for venue purposes should therefore be either the location of its 
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office or agent for the conduct of its usual and customary business or the 
location of its agent for the service of process. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The bifurcated decision rendered in the Armstrong and Taylor cases 
evidences the court’s recognition of a need for change.  Yet, it also evidences 
an unwillingness to break from the precedent established by O’Keefe and its 
progeny.  When the court’s ship finally sinks under the rolling waves of 
unnecessary complexity and illogical results, perhaps then will the court take 
action in instilling a new statutory construction.  This new statutory 
construction needs to be simple and it needs to be consistent.  And it can be 
accomplished.  All that is required is that the court recognizes that its prior 
interpretation is too complex and illogical.  Rather than having competing 
venue statutes, which in turn results in litigious competition, there needs to be 
harmony.  Section 508.040 should locate a corporate defendant’s residence in 
any county where that corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its 
usual and customary business regardless of whether or not that corporation is 
joined with other unincorporated defendants.  Section 351.375 can still be used 
to locate a corporation’s residence in the county of its registered agent for 
purposes of section 508.010, but this should serve only as creating another 
venue choice—not destroying all other choices granted under section 508.040. 
As Judge Storckman stated in his dissent in Bowden: “I am convinced that 
there is nothing radically wrong with [Missouri] venue statutes if they are 
properly construed.”193  There is truth to this statement.  For it is not the venue 
statutes per se that are complex and illogical; it is the court’s interpretation of 
them. 
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